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THE FAA: A TOMBSTONE AGENCY?
PUTTING THE NICKNAME TO THE TEST
Rebecca K. Lutte and Brent D. Bowen
University of Nebraska at Omaha

ABSTRACT
The purpose of this research was to investigate Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
activity before and after six catastrophic airline accidents to examine the alleged reactive policysetting reputation of the FAA. Actions reviewed were regulatory, inspection, and enforcement
activities. The study revealed that change in agency activity does occur following an accident.
The location of the event appears to influence the direction of change. When accidents occurred
within the United States, FAA activity increased following the accident. The opposite occurred
for airline accidents outside the U.S. The increase in FAA activity following U.S. based events,
supports the reactive, tombstone agency reputation the FAA has acquired.
In addition, the research revealed nine FAA activities judged by industry experts as
having the ability to improve safety in the airline industry. Inspections and certificate actions are
considered activities that will improve safety. Regulatory actions, fines, warning notices, and
letters of correction were judged as non-safety enhancing activities. The result of this research
was an increased understanding of how the FAA responds to airline accidents and the
consequences of the response.
THE REPUTATION OF THE FAA

safety program. The agency s continuous
refusal to acknowledge its shortcomings is
indicative of a managerial culture that denies
problems exist, defends the status quo and
uses public relations spins to deflect
criticism (Phillips, 1996, p. 31). Criticism
exists over the amount of influence the
industry, particularly airlines, has over the
FAA (Ullmann, 1996; Bryant, 1996;
Gleckman, 1996). In fact, the FAA admits it
works slowly because it needs to balance
the benefits of safety changes with airlines
and crews interests ( FAA s snail space , 1999). Critical of the industry
influence over FAA policy, an assistant U.S.
attorney, after several investigations of FAA
positions on safety policies, said to former

The Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) is the agency charged with safety
oversight in the aviation industry. The
organization is under fire in the media for
not taking actions to meet this goal. The
FAA has been criticized for being overly
responsive to external actors. Some believe
responsiveness to media, following the
ValuJet accident, played a role in the
airline s shut down and subsequent
resignations of several key FAA officials
(Shifrin, 1996a). During ValuJet hearings,
Former
Senator
Cohen
told
the
subcommittee, the FAA s problems are
much deeper than ValuJet and its troubled
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brings. Take for example the following
scenario. A crisis occurs, the crash of an
airliner. The FAA responds by increasing
inspections of airlines. Do industry experts
believe such activity (increased inspections)
will enhance the safety of the airline
industry? To explore FAA policy practices,
the following research questions were
developed.

FAA official, Anthony Broderick, You are
supposed to regulate, not represent, the
airlines (Cary, Hedges, & Walsh, 1996, p.
50).
Others have gone so far as to say that
the FAA itself is a safety problem (Glieck,
1996). The organization was described by
one author (Ullmann, 1996) as secretive
FAA management, whose military mind set,
industry sympathies, and resistance to
change give critics fits (p. 39). A
Newsweek article also presents the claim
that the FAA is unresponsive. Thanks to
inept management, bureaucratic inertia, and
the constant tugging of powerful economic
interests, the FAA remains one of the
government s least adaptive agencies
(Levinson, Underwood, & Turque, 1996, p.
46). The agency has been accused of
possessing a tombstone mentality of acting
only after a tragedy (Ullmann, 1996, p. 39).
In the past few years, the FAA has come
under fire for being reactive and not
proactive, responding to safety concerns
only after a catastrophic accident has
occurred (Phillips, 1995; Shifrin, 1996b).

1. Does a change in agency activity
occur following a crisis event?
2. Is agency activity perceived to
improve safety in the airline
industry?
METHODOLOGY
To address the research questions, a
method was required that would allow for
analysis of FAA activity variables and for
establishing the importance of these
variables to improving safety. The
appropriate method should (a) provide
comparable measures of agency activity
before and after an accident, (b) result in
determination of relative importance of
variables regarding ability to improve airline
safety, and (c) be congruent with publicly
available data.
Given the criteria, the method
selected was a weighted average. Weighted
average development begins with the use of
expert opinion (Clark & Friedman, 1982;
McMeniman, 1990; Bowen, Headley &
Luedtke, 1992) to determine importance
weights. Each weight is then applied to the
associated data. These values are added
together and the total is divided by the sum
of all the weights. The standard formula for
the weighted average (×) is:

RESEARCH QUESTIONS
While criticism of the FAA certainly
exists, surprisingly, no previous research has
been located that addresses these claims.
This research provides the first step toward
examining the reputation the FAA has
developed for their alleged reactive policysetting practices. An exploration of FAA
actions before and immediately after a tragic
event, such as an airline accident, will
address these issues. Furthermore, why
study crises at all if not to reduce the
occurrence of future events? Perhaps more
critical than knowing whether policy change
occurs following a crisis is knowing what
consequences, if any, such policy action

×= w1X1 + w2X2 + ...... + wkXk = ∑wX
∑w
w1 + w2 + ..... + wk
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A discussion of the weight assigned to these
factors, indicating the importance of the
activity to improving safety, along with
examination of the level of activity using
frequency distributions, will address
question two. For example, if unannounced
ramp inspections of flight operations are
judged to be an important agency activity
for the purpose of increased safety, the
frequencies of this activity prior to and after
accidents will be presented and discussed.

where w represents the associated weight for
variable X (Spiegel, 1996, p. 59). The
weighted average has been used in the field
of aviation to develop the now well-known
and highly-publicized Airline Quality Rating
(Bowen, et.al., 1992). Using this
methodology would provide the aviation
industry with a measure of FAA response to
accidents. The methodology would, as noted
by Bowen, et. al (1992), provide such
information in a timely manner using
publicly-available data. The FAA has
expanded public access to airline safety
data. The release of information about
individual carriers is in response to a call by
the public and members of Congress for
more safety information (Phillips, 1997).
The move to release information was
prompted by a deadly year for U.S. airlines,
the crashes of ValuJet 592 and TWA 800 in
1996.
The standard weighted average
formula can be calculated using FAA
activity. Weights, indicating the perceived
importance of each FAA activity to
improving airline safety can be associated
with publicly available FAA data. The end
result is a single value indicating FAA
agency activity as shown below.

Selecting the Variables for the SAR
FAA activity was defined as policy
outputs of the regulatory agency. Those
policy outputs are regulatory, inspection,
and enforcement activity. Safety experts
consider fines and administrative actions
important elements to consider when
evaluating airline safety (Stoller, 2000). The
regulatory category includes two measures
of activity: number of Notice of Proposed
Rulemakings (NPRMs) and number of new
Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs). The
inspection category includes en route
inspections, facility inspections, record/log
inspections, and spot/ramp (no notice)
inspections. The inspections refer to activity
or inspections of the following operations
areas: flight operations and maintenance.
The terms used here are derived from the
FAA Enforcement Information System
(EIS)
code
list
(Department
of
Transportation, 1998). The enforcement
category includes three measures of activity:
occurrence of fines against airlines,
occurrence of certificate actions (suspension
or revocation), and written notifications of
safety concerns and/or violations (warning
notice or letter of correction).
The SAR was applied to an equal
time frame before and after six accidents
between 1988-1999. Accidents, as defined
by the National Transportation Safety Board

SAR= w1A1 + w2A2 + w3A3 + ......wnAn
w1 + w2 + w3+...wn
In this equation, (SAR) refers to safety
activity rating, (w) refers to the weight
assigned to each FAA activity (A). A
separate value, or SAR, can be calculated
for the time frame before and after each
accident, allowing for comparison of agency
activity.
To address question two, frequency
distributions can be presented. The SAR is
composed of factors that have been judged
by industry experts, for importance in
improving the safety of the airline industry.
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represented or over represented (Folz,
1996). A pre-test, considered a critical
quality-control device (Folz, 1996, p.120),
was conducted. Additionally, a test for scale
reliability, Cronbach s Alpha (Cronbach,
1951) was calculated. According to
Carmines and Zeller (1979), this test is an
excellent
technique
for
assessing
reliability (p. 50) and therefore should be
computed for any multiple-item scale (p.
51). The values of coefficient alpha typically
range from zero to one; the higher the value,
the greater the internal consistency (Spector,
1992). Generally, a value of .6 or higher is
acceptable but .8 or higher is preferred
(Bowen, Headley, Kane, & Lutte, 1999;
Carmines & Zellar, 1979). This research
resulted in an alpha of .87. The mail
questionnaire occurred in two phases and
resulted in a usable response rate of 48%, an
acceptable rate according to the literature
(Czaja & Blair, 1996; Dooley, 1995; Folz,
1996). Questionnaire results are presented in
Appendix B.
Once the results from the
questionnaire were recorded, the mean
response for each question was tabulated.
The purpose of calculating the mean was to
establish weights for each variable in the
SAR formula. To continue building the
formula, the activity data were entered. For
each accident, FAA data were gathered for a
period of 12 months prior to and 12 months
following the accident. Birkland (1997)
concluded that two years is an adequate time
frame to monitor activity related to a crisis.
Additionally, since the FAA has the ability
to quickly initiate the variables described for
this study, and as Kingdon (1995) points
out, the window of opportunity for change
following an aviation accident is short lived,
a 12 month period is an appropriate length
of time to gauge agency activity. Collection
was conducted through the use of documents
search, World Wide Web, and FAA

(NTSB), which involved United States
based, Part 121 scheduled airlines and which
resulted in 100 or more fatalities were
selected. Not surprisingly, data show that
most fatal airline accidents result in few
lives lost or many lives lost. For example,
from 1988 to 1999, (a) 13 accidents, each of
which resulted in one to 25 fatalities,
occurred; (b) three accidents, each of which
resulted in 26 to 99 fatalities, occurred; and
(c) six accidents, each of which resulted in
100 or more fatalities, occurred (National
Transportation Safety Board, 2000). The
purpose of using these years (1988-99) is to
provide an adequate amount of accident
data. Although accidents of this magnitude
are rare, the time span will result in six
accidents to review (see Appendix A).
DATA COLLECTION & ANALYSIS
Expert opinion was gathered to
determine the relative importance of each
item to improving the overall safety of the
airline industry. To gather the expert
opinions, a questionnaire was constructed.
The subject selection process resulted in a
nonprobability, purposive sample. Subjects
included airline safety department personnel
from U.S. based, part 121 airlines, pilots
from the primary pilot organizations
including Allied Pilot Association (APA),
Airline Pilots Association (ALPA), and
International Association of Continental
Pilots (IACP). FAA inspectors from regional
and local FAA offices, investigators from
NTSB regional offices, and university
researchers with knowledge and research
experience in areas including aviation
safety, FAA activities, and airline operations
were also included. Researchers were
identified with the assistance of University
Aviation Association (UAA). To minimize
bias, no group was systematically under
15

database searches. Since the research
resulted in a large amount of data, the FAA
activity data have been summarized in two
tables. The first, Appendix C, lists the
activities that were judged by the experts as
having the ability to enhance safety in the
airline industry (mean response score of 5.0
or higher). Appendix D displays the same
information for those activities judged as not
having the ability to enhance safety.
With all the data collected, the SAR
was applied to each of the six accidents.
Research question one can be answered by
comparing the SAR prior to each accident
(to be known as SAR0) to the corresponding
SAR following the accident (SAR1). This

was accomplished by using a simple ratio as
seen below.
Change in SAR = SAR1 - SAR0
SAR0
The SARs for each accident for the year
prior to (base year) and the year following
the accident and the change in SARs are
summarized in Table 1.
As the data in Table 1 reveal,
patterns in agency activity do exist.
Increases occurred following four of the
accidents under review. All four of these
accidents occurred in the United States.

Table 1
Change in SAR Scores (indicating FAA activity) From the Twelve Month Period Before the
Accident (SAR0) to the Twelve Month Period After the Accident (SAR1)
Accident

SAR0

SAR1

Change in SAR

PanAM 103

124.3

110.0

- 11.5 %

United 232

477.3

618.8

+ 29.6 %

USAir 427

370.1

388.6

+ 4.9 %

American 965

426.7

384.3

- 9.9 %

ValuJet 592

47.3

173.9

+ 267.6 %

TWA 800

240.9

349.9

+ 45.2 %

16

Comparing the list of activities
judged as safety enhancing, to the actual
activity levels, is revealing. Increases in
activity occurred in five of the nine activities
judged as safety enhancing (see Appendix
C). The greatest increase occurred in the
highest
ranked
activity.
Ramp/spot
inspections of maintenance had the highest
score for improving safety and had the
largest overall increase in activity level
following an accident. The overall postaccident increase in the number of
maintenance ramp/spot inspections was
2,229. No change occurred in two of the
nine activities judged as safety enhancing;
certificate suspensions and revocations. No
such FAA actions took place during any
time period under review. The two activities
that experienced an overall decrease in
activity, facility inspections of flight
operations and enroute inspections, also
experienced the smallest amount of change.
It is useful when answering question
two, to also examine the data related to
activities that were not perceived to improve
safety. A summary of change in activity
levels is provided in Appendix D. According
to the data displayed for regulatory
activities, issuance of FARs following
accidents increased at a higher amount than
issuance of post-accident NPRMs. FARs
were rated by the industry experts as having
a greater ability than NPRMs to improve
safety. The enforcement categories that were
judged as not having the ability to improve
safety in the airline industry included fines,
warning notices, and letters of correction.
Three categories of fines were reviewed.
The category of fine judged as least
effective in improving safety was the type of
fine imposed most often. Warning notices
were issued more often than letters of
correction although they were judged
equally by industry experts.
After reviewing all activity levels,
the answer to question two is yes, with one

The SAR following the USAir crash
increased by only 4.9%. United 232 and
TWA 800 resulted in larger changes of 29.6%
and 45.2%, respectively. The largest change
occurred following the ValuJet 592 accident.
The SAR increased by 267.6% in the twelve
months after the DC-9 crash. In the two cases
where decreases occurred, both accidents
happened outside the United States. The
PanAM 103 bombing over Lockerbie,
Scotland and the American 965 crash in Cali,
Colombia both resulted in a decrease in the
Safety Activity Rating.
To answer question two, those
activities perceived as having the ability to
improve safety in the airline industry must be
identified. This is accomplished by a review
of the expert opinions. Industry experts were
asked their opinions as to whether certain
FAA activities will result in improved safety
in the airline industry. The results of the
questionnaire were used to identify the safety
enhancing FAA activities.
Based on the mean scores from the
industry expert responses, nine activities were
identified as having the ability to improve
safety in the airline industry. The nine
activities are listed in Figure 1. The activities
are rank-ordered, starting with those activities
with the highest score for ability to improve
safety in the airline industry.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Ramp/spot inspections - maintenance (5.5)
Facility inspections - maintenance (5.5)
Certificate suspension (5.4)
Certificate revocation (5.3)
Facility inspections - flight operations (5.3)
Enroute inspections - flight operations (5.2)
Ramp/spot inspections - flight operations
(5.2)
8. Record/log inspections - maintenance (5.2)
9. Record/log inspections - flight operations
(5.1)

Figure 1. FAA activities identified as safety
enhancing.
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major exception. Agency activity is perceived
to improve safety in the airline industry. Out
of nine identified safety- enhancing activities,
two experienced no change in activity, two
decreased, and five increased. The exception
is enforcement activity in the area of fines.
One category of fines, those below $10,000,
showed an overall increase in activity
following accidents. The enforcement activity
received not only the lowest score for ability
to improve safety in the airline industry of all
three categories of fines, but also received the
lowest score of all sixteen FAA activities.
The type of fine most often enacted following
an accident is the type of fine, and the FAA
activity, judged as least effective in
improving safety.

improve safety in the airline industry.
Inspections and certificate actions are
considered activities that will improve
safety in the airline industry.
4. Regulatory actions, fines, warning
notices, and letters of correction were
judged by experts as non-safety
enhancing activities.
5. With the exception of fines, FAA postaccident activity is perceived to improve
safety in the airline industry. The
majority of the nine identified safety
enhancing activities displayed an overall
increase following a crisis event.
6. The FAA enforcement activity judged as
least effective in ability to improve
safety, was the most often used method
of enforcement following accidents.
Fines in an amount less than $10,000
were the only category of fines to
experience an overall increase following
accidents.

CONCLUSIONS
Based on the study, numerous
conclusions regarding agency activity can be
drawn. Below is a summary of these
conclusions.
1. A change in FAA agency activity does
occur following an accident. The location
of the accident appears to influence the
direction of change. When the event
occurred outside the United States, the
FAA activity levels decreased. Agency
activity increased following accidents that
occurred in the United States.

THE FAA: REPUTATION DESERVED
What we know now is that the six
cases examined here support the claim that
FAA activity is driven not only by accidents,
but by the location of those events. Another
result of this study is the discovery that FAA
agency behavior is perceived to improve
safety. Inspections and certificate actions
were activities judged as having the ability
to improve safety. The majority of the safety
enhancing activities displayed an overall
increase following a catastrophic airline
accident.
The
FAA,
however,
should
reconsider use of fines. Following accidents,
the type of fine most often imposed by the
FAA was a fine below $10,000. These fines
were judged as least effective of all FAA

2. The increase in FAA activity levels,
following catastrophic accidents in the
United States, supports the reactive policy
or “tombstone agency” reputation the
agency has acquired. In every case where
an accident occurred in the United States
and resulted in more than 100 fatalities, a
rise in agency activity was displayed.
3. Nine FAA activities were judged by
industry experts as having the ability to
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actions in ability to improve safety.
Additionally, since large fines (those above
$100,000) are rarely imposed, perhaps such
fines should serve as a red flag to the FAA.
A fine of such a substantial amount may be a
signal of a growing safety problem. Case-inpoint, the only such fine imposed during the
period under review for this study was a onetime $200,000 fine against ValuJet in the 12
months before the crash of Flight 592.
Perhaps the FAA and airline managers should
consider such enforcement actions as cause
for concern.
TAKING IT TO THE NEXT LEVEL
Results here prompt many new
questions. For example, why the change in
action following crashes occurring elsewhere
in the world? The FAA still has control over
the carriers involved in those accidents. Why
not exercise it? Perhaps it relates to
investigation jurisdiction or information
access? Additionally, why did such a large
increase in FAA activity (276%) occur
following the ValuJet crash? Perhaps intense
media coverage played a role. Does the size
of the carrier prompt differences in action?
Another question can be raised regarding the
FAA use of fines in small amounts. Why
would the FAA focus on actions that are not
perceived to improve safety? One may
assume that FAA personnel are not aware of
or do not agree with the experts evaluation
of these non-safety enhancing activities. This
study took the first step in exploring FAA
accident related activity. Additional research
should be conducted to explore these and
other related research questions.
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Appendix A
Airline Accidents (Scheduled, Part 121) Resulting in 100 or More Fatalities for the Years 1988 –
1999
Date

Flight

Location

Fatalities

Description

12/21/88

PanAM 103

Lockerbie,
Scotland

270

747 terrorist bombing

7/19/89

United 232

Sioux City, IA

111

DC-10 loss of hydraulics

9/8/94

USAir 427

Aliquippa, PA

132

737 roll over

12/20/95

American
965

Cali, Columbia

160

757 controlled flight into
terrain

5/11/96

ValuJet 592

Miami, FL

110

DC-9 hazardous materials
fire

7/17/96

TWA 800

Moriches, NY

230

747 mid-air explosion

Source: (National Transportation Safety Board, 2000)
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Appendix B
Summary of Questionnaire Results (reported by frequency of responses) Indicating Level of
Agreement Regarding Ability of Activity to Improve Safety in the Airline Industry
Str.
Disagree

Mod.
Disagree

Slt.
Disagree

Ntrl

Slt.
Agree

Mod.
Agree

Str.
Agree

1: FARs

6

5

1

13

15

13

5

2: NPRMs

8

7

5

16

10

10

2

3: fines < 10K

15

13

11

5

7

6

2

4: fines 10K 100K

7

9

13

9

14

7

0

5: fines > 100K

6

2

9

6

18

13

5

6: suspension

3

3

4

4

9

15

21

7: revocation

5

4

4

2

10

11

23

8: warning

4

8

4

4

26

9

4

9: correction

6

5

6

8

16

12

6

10: enroute

1

3

5

4

16

19

11

11: ramp/flt

1

3

5

4

20

14

12

12: ramp/mx

0

0

5

2

21

18

13

13: fac/flt

1

4

1

4

21

19

9

14: fac/mx

0

1

3

3

20

21

11

15: records/flt

1

1

4

7

23

18

5

16: records/mx

1

0

4

5

23

21

5

Regulatory

Enforcement

Inspection
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Appendix C
Change in FAA Activity Levels (activities judged as having the ability to
improve safety in the airline industry) From the Year Before the Accident to
the Year Following the Accident
Inspection Activity
Ramp:
Maint.

Facility:
Maint.

Facility:
Flight

Enrt.
Insp.

Ramp:
Flight

Records:
Maint.

Records:
Flight

ValuJet 592

953

100

(1)

54

48

102

8

United 232

1,522

127

71

(459)

431

146

127

USAir 427

(70)

8

(47)

500

(127)

29

(18)

American 965

(192)

(21)

(36)

(186)

(100)

(62)

(13)

TWA 800

127

16

3

99

26

55

(16)

PanAM 103

(111)

46

(26)

(25)

(53)

(21)

(14)

Airlines
Increased

3

5

2

3

3

4

2

Airlines
Decreased

3

1

4

3

3

2

4

Overall Change
in Activity

2,229

276

(36)

(17)

225

249

74

Accidents

Note. Parentheses ( ) indicate a decrease in activity levels.
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Appendix D
Changes in FAA Activity Levels (activities judged as not having the ability
to improve safety in the airline industry) From the Year Before the Accident
to the Year Following the Accident
Regulatory

Enforcement

FARs

NPRMs

Fines <
10K

Fines
10Kto
100K

Fines
> 100K

Warning
Notices

Letters of
Correction

PanAM 103

3

1

(1)

0

0

4

(8)

United 232

6

(1)

4

(2)

0

1

3

USAir 427

2

(2)

1

(4)

0

0

1

American
965

4

3

4

(3)

0

1

(4)

ValuJet 592

5

1

0

1

(1)

0

0

TWA 800

(5)

(1)

4

(1)

0

1

1

Airlines
Increased

5

3

4

1

0

4

3

Airlines
Decreased

1

3

1

4

1

0

2

Overall
change in
activity

15

1

12

(9)

(1)

7

(7)

Accidents

Note. Parentheses ( ) indicate a decrease in activity levels.
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